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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY COpy 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
SCOTT TOBERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LAROSE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et al. 
Defendants, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
LAROSE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et al. * 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SCOTT TOBERMAN, et al. 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Civil Action File No. 2007CVl31894 
(Business D'~iN~ FleE I SEP 1_~ 2007 
DEPUlY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNlY. GA 
ORDER ON MOTION TO INTERVENE 
Houston Casualty Company ("Houston") filed a Motion to Intervene in this action on 
August 28, 2007, in order to stay this action until the resolution of a pending declaratory suit in 
federal court between Houston and EAR. In the alternative, Houston requests an extension of 
time to give EAR additional time to retain counsel and to respond to GEF's pending Motion for 
Entry of Final Judgment. 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24 provides for intervention by right (statutory right) or with the 
permission of the court. A court may permit intervention under O.C.G.A. §9-11-24(b) upon (1) a 
showing of a conditional statutory right to intervene, or (2) when the applicant's claim or defense 
shares a common question oflaw or fact with the main action. "In exercising its discretion the 
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the 
!:J rights ofthe original parties." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24 (b). Additionally, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(c) 
o 
() 
establishes the appropriate procedures for intervention requiring that the motion to intervene be 
accompanied by a pleading setting forth the applicant's claim or defense. 
Houston advances no unconditional or conditional statutory right to intervene and no 
cOimnon question oflaw or fact. Additionally, Houston did not include pleadings setting forth its 
claim or defense in this action with its motion to intervene. 
On May 10,2007, Houston agreed to defend EAR under a reservation of rights. In July, 
2007, after the second group of EAR lawyers provided by Houston was pennitted withdraw, the 
Court granted EAR's request to postpone for an additional sixty (60) daysl the hearings on 
EAR's motions for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss claims of certain counterclaimants. 
During the July conference on the second motion to withdraw, GEF Partnerships infonned the 
Court and EAR that it intended to move for final judgment, to request supersedeas bond, and to 
request an expedited hearing on those issues. At EAR's request, the Court agreed that EAR 
would have thirty (30) days to respond to any such motions. On July 26, 2007, GEF Partnerships 
moved for entry of supersedeas bond and final judgment, which was set for a hearing on 
September 11, 2007. Houston knew or should have known ofthe September 11 'h date from EAR 
or by review of the relevant orders available in the public record. This Motion to Intervene, 
however, was not filed until August 28, 2007. 
Houston relies upon Richmond v. Georgia Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 140 
Ga. App. 215 (1976), to support its contention that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24 authorizes intervention 
by an insurance carrier and a stay ofthe main case pending final resolution of the declaratory 
judgment action. Richmond, however, was not a case that evaluated the appropriateness of an 
1. The motions were originally scheduled for hearing on June 19, 2007, but were rescheduled for July 11,2007 when 
McGuire Woods withdrew its representation of EAR and the other plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants. During the 
hearing on September 11, 2007, the Court will reschedule a hearing for the pending EAR motions. 
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intervention by an insurance carrier and a stay ofthe main action. Instead when deciding other, 
related issues, the Court in Richmond recommended ''best practices" for insurance carriers who 
dispute coverage, which include providing a defense under an agreed to reservation of rights 
agreement, or, in the alternative, to provide notice to the insured of the reservation ofrights, 
taking steps necessary to prevent prejudice to the insured, and seeking immediate declaratory 
relief, including a stay. 140 Ga. App. 215, 219. Houston did not immediately seek intervention in 
this action. Its delay alone distinguishes the Court of Appeals' recommendations in Richmond. 
According to the briefS, the pending declaratory judgment action in federal court was filed 
by EAR in December 2005. Houston did not answer until November 2006. Although, Houston 
has filed a motion for summary judgment in the case, no hearing date has been obtained. Thus, 
Houston appears not to have sought immediate relief in the declaratory judgment action. 
Turning to a consideration of "the delay and prejudice" to the original parties as required 
by O.C.G.A. § 9-1 I -24, this Court finds that this case was originally filed by EAR in 2005. EAR 
unsuccessfully appealed an earlier trial court's order to the Court of Appeals, thus causing a delay 
in the case. In May, 2007, GEF Partnerships obtained a partial summary judgment. Houston has 
indicated that EAR's failure to provide potential counsel with assurances to pay invoices in the 
event that Houston is successful in the declaratory judgment action is contributing to the failure to 
obtain counsel in this case. 
Alternatively, Houston asks for an extension oftime to allow EAR to obtain another 
lawyer. The Court has already provided EAR with two (2) extensions oftime to secure counsel, 
which were requested and agreed to by EAR. According to Houston's Motion, the current 
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problem in obtaining replacement counsel is EAR and Mr. Toberman's refusal to provide payment 
assurances separate from insurance representation. 
Accordingly, this Motion to Intervene is hereby DENIED, and the request for an 
extension of time is hereby DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this IcJ ~ay of September, 2007. 
Copies to: 
Christine H. Hall 
Kathleen M. Murley 
Cruser & Mitchell, LP 
Counselfor Houston Casualty Co. 
Peachtree Ridge, Suite 750 
3500 Parkway Lane 
Norcross, GA 30092 
(404) 881-2622 
(404) 881-2630 fax 
Anthony Cochran, Esq. 
Chilivis, Cochran, Larking & Bever, LLP 
3127 Maple Dr. N.E. 
Atlanta, Georgia 30305 
(404) 233-4171 
Greg Shinall, Esq. 
Dina Rollman, Esq. 
Sperling & Slater, P.c. 
55 West Monroe Street 
Suite 3200 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
(312) 368-5937 
Debra Wilson, Esq. 
JUDGE 
Superio~ Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, LLP 
1600 Candler Building 
127 Peachtree Street, N .E. 
Atlanta, GA 30303-1845 
(404) 681-3450 
Gary Marsh, Esq. 
McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP 
303 Peachtree Street, NE, 
Suite 5300 
Atlanta, GA 30308 
(404) 527-4150 . 
Tobennan Entities 
Attn: Scott K. Tobennan 
3525 Piedmont Road 
Building 5, Suite 10 
Atlanta, Georgia, 30305 
(770) 850-3100 
Scott K. Tobennan 
2875 Wyngate Road 
Atlanta, Georgia 30305 
(770) 850-3100 
